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REcENT CAsEs
of the witness. This is particularly true since the expert witness will
be subject to cross examination as to the methods and validity of the
testing process.
Wayne I. Carroll
ILLEGAL SEARCa AND SEmIZUR-PowER OF A FEDERAL CouRT To ENioiN
A FEDERAL AGENT FROM TESTIFYING IN A STATE CouRT-The United
States Constitution prohibits illegal searches and seizures,' but makes
no mention of the admissibility of evidence so obtained before a
court. Until this century both federal and state courts accepted
the common law rule that, with few exceptions, evidence other-
wise admissible need not be excluded because it is illegally ob-
tained.2 The specific rule that in the field of searches and seizures
evidence should be excluded if it has been illegally seized was
first laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States some
seventy years ago.3 But it was not until 1914 that the rule was clearly
enunciated by that Court in Weeks v. United States4 in which the
Court held that evidence illegally obtained by federal officials in
violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in a federal prose-
cution." However, generally, the Supreme Court has not seen fit to
I U.S. Const., Amend. 4:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
2 8 Wigmore, Evidence Secs. 2188, 2184 (3d ed. 1940). The rationalization
for the rule is that to exclude such evidence would only be to free the guilty, i.e.,
one malefactor should not claim the right to escape prosecution by reason of the
illegal acts of another. Also, if the evidence is relevant, any argument as to the
illegality of obtaining it is merely a "collateral issue."
3 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
4282 U.S. 883 (1914). The common law power of courts to develop rules
for the admissibility of evidence is a well recognized judicial function.
5 Id. at 393,
"If letters and private documents can be thus taken and held and
used as evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protec-
tion of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure
against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those
thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Con-
stitution."
For a criticism of this rule see 8 Wigamore, Evidence, Sec. 2184 at 40 (3d ed.
1940) in which he states,
"The natural way to do justice here would be to enforce the healthy
principle of the Fourth Amendment directly, i.e. by sending for the
high-banded, over-zealous marshall who had made a search without a
warrant ,imposing a thirty-day imprisonment for his contempt of the
Constitution, and then proceeding to affirm the sentence of the con-
victed criminal."
As a reply to this, it should be noted that prosecutions of the "over-zealous
marshal' have proven to be ineffective, as have civil actions against him.
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exclude from federal prosecutions illegally seized evidence unless a
federal officer perpetrated the wrong or state officials acted solely for
the purpose of enforcing federal law.0
The Supreme Court in Wolf v. Colorado7 held that in a state
prosecution for a state crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not
forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search
and seizure. Consequently, the adoption of the exclusionary rule is
discretionary with the individual state's court.8 The Supreme Court
reaffirmed the Wolf holding in Stefanelli v. Minard9 in denying the
petitioner's motion to enjoin directly a state official from using evidence
seized in violation of the Federal Civil Rights Statute.10 In Stefanelli v.
Minard the Court declared that although it had the power to enjoin
the use of the state seized evidence, it should refuse to exercise its
discretionary equity powers to "interfere with or embarrass threatened
proceedings in State courts save in those exceptional cases which call
for the interposition of a court of equity to prevent irreparable injury
which is clear and imminent," because the issuance of such an injunc-
tion would upset the "special delicacy of the adjustment to be pre-
served between federal equity power and state administration of its
own law" and thus "would invite a flanking movement against the
system of state courts by resort to the federal forum.""
It should be noted that in all the cases in which the federal courts
have applied the federal exclusionary rule they have done so solely
for the purpose of admitting or rejecting evidence before federal courts
in federal prosecutions. However, in a recent case'2 the Supreme
Court by an assertion of a general supervisory power over federal law
enforcement officials put what, under the spirit and rationalizations
6 Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927); United States v. Butler,
156 F. 2d 897 (CCA1O 1946).
7338 U.S. 25 (1948).
8 Twenty-one states, including Kentucky, have adopted the exclusionary rule
(for a list of these states see 50 A.L.R. 2d 536). Twenty-five states follow the old
common law rule without qualification while two qualify it in certain respects (50
A.L.R. 2d 543). Kentucky does not allow the admission of evidence obtained by
an illegal search and seizure by either state officials, Parrott v. Commonwealth, 287
S.W. 2d 440 (Ky. 1956), or federal officials, Walters v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky.
182, 250 S.W. 839 (1923). However, such evidence is not inadmissible if secured
by a private person acting on his own initiative, Gilliam v. Commonwealth, 263
Ky. 342, 92 S.W. 2d 346 (1936).
9342 U.S. 117 (1951).
10 R.S. Sec. 1979 (1875), now 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983 (1952). The Supreme
Court declared in this case, just as it did in Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199
(1952), that in the absence of an express intent by Congress, the Court should
interpret such acts as not to make illegally seized evidence inadmissible in state
court proceedings.
11 Supra note 9 at 120, 122, 123.12 Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 at 216, 217 (1956).
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of previous decisions,13 is constitutionally admissible evidence beyond
the reach of a state court and thereby, in effect, imposed the federal
exclusionary rule on a state court in regard to evidence seized illegally
by a federal law enforcement official while acting under a defective
federal search warrant.
In this case the petitioner was indicted under a federal statute for
the unlawful acquisition of marijuana based on evidence obtained by
a federal narcotics agent acting under a search warrant issued by a
United States Commissioner. On a motion by the petitioner, the dis-
trict court suppressed the evidence on the ground that the warrant was
insufficient on its face and dismissed the indictment. Subsequently,
the federal agent swore to a complaint in a New Mexico state court
and the petitioner was charged with violation of the state narcotics
act. Petitioner then sought in a federal district court to enjoin the
federal agent from testifying in the state court with respect to the
evidence obtained by virtue of the improper search warrant.14 The
District Court denied the motion and on appeal the Circuit Court
affirmed. The Supreme Court of the United States by a 5-4 decision
reversed the Circuit Court, holding that a federal court could enjoin
a federal law enforcement official from testifying in a state criminal
case with respect to evidence obtained by him while acting under an
invalid federal search warrant. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214
(1956).
The majority opinion put all constitutional issues to one side
stating that this is merely a case involving the federal court's super-
visory powers over federal law enforcement officials and not affecting
in any way the use which New Mexico might make of the unlawfully
seized evidence. The Court declares that the powers of the federal
courts extend to policing and enforcing the requirements of the Fed-
eral Rules governing searches and seizures. 15 The Court further de-
clares that, since a federal agent has violated those Rules, to enjoin
him from testifying is merely to enforce the Rules against those owing
obedience to them.'
As was conceded by the dissenting opinion, since the federal law
l3 Supra note 7 and note 9.
14Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e), 18 U.S.C. (1952).
15 Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 41, 18 U.S.C. (1952), regulates the conduct of
searches and seizures. Rule 41(c) in particular was violated. Federal courts have
the power to control the disposition of contraband, the marijuana here, under 28
U.S.C. See. 2463 (1952), but this section provides no support for enjoining the
testimony.
10 Since the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are specifically made ap-
plicable only to proceedings before the federal judiciary, there a ppears little justi-
fcation for holding that the Rules govern the conduct of federal officials in state
courts. Fed. R. Crim. P. 54(a); see 18 U.S.C. Sees. 377-72 (1952).
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enforcement official was acting under an implied federal search war-
rant the Court undeniably had the power to issue the injunction,17 but
previously, in regard to the use of illegally seized evidence in state
prosecutions, the Court had said that federal courts under their dis-
cretionary powers should refuse "to interfere with or embarrass
threatened proceedings in state courts save in those exceptional cases
which call for the interposition of a court of equity to prevent ir-
reparable injury which is clear and imminent. .. ."18 In Stefanelli v.
Minard the court held that no such "irreparable injury" was threatened
although a conviction hinged upon the introduction of the illegally
seized evidence.
As noted previously, under the decisions of the Wolf case and its
successors the illegality of the seizure of the evidence does not neces-
sarily bar its admission in a state prosecution. However, in the present
case the court distinguished Wolf v. Colorado'0 and Stefanelli v.
Minard"2 in which action was sought directly against a state court or
state officials, on the ground that the Court was "not asked to enjoin
state officials nor in any way to interfere with state agencies in enforce-
ment of state law."21 But since the enjoined evidence was the sole
basis of the state prosecution, this reasoning is illusory for, as recog-
nized by the dissenting opinion, the injunction would "operate quite
as effectively, albeit indirectly, to stultify the state prosecution as if it
had been issued directly against New Mexico or its officials."22
Thus the federal rule of exclusion, which the Court has held that
it would not impose on the states directly,23 is her imposed indirectly
by use of the Court's supervisory power.24
Equally astonishing as the Court's declaration of such an indirect
power over state courts is its assertion of a general supervisory power
over federal executive law enforcement officials. Since the enjoined
official was a member of the executive branch of the federal govern-
ment this decision results in a judicial encroachment into the hereto-
17 Wise v. Henkel, 220 U.S. 556 (1911), cited by the majority, supports the
assertion that the Court has the power to correct an abuse of its process by means
of an injunction.
Is Supra note 9 at 122; Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943).
19 Supra note 7.2o Supra note 9.
21 Supra note 12 at 216.22 Supra note 12 at 219.23 Supra note 7.24
' The concept of supervisory power of the standards of admissibility of
evidence originated in England as a judicial method to curb the police abuses in
obtaining evidence. The court promulgated rules for police officers in their inter-
rogation of persons under custody. Strict adherence to the rules was a condition
precedent to the admissibility of confessions as evidence." 80 Temple L.Q. 68,
69, citing McCormick, Hand Book of the Law of Evidence 240 (1954).
[Vol. 46,
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fore exclusive domain of the executive.25 As authority for its general
supervisory power over law enforcement agents of the executive, the
Court cites McNabb v. United States,26 which stands for no such broad
proposition as that asserted here. McNabb v. United States stands for
the limited proposition that federal courts have a supervisory power
over federal law enforcement agencies in that by admitting or re-
jecting in federal court the evidence obtained by such agencies the
courts control the conduct of the agencies to that limited extent.2 '
But in Rea v. United States there existed no such situation as that of
McNabb v. United States as the evidence was not to be presented in
a federal court in a federal prosecution but rather in a state court in
a state prosecution.28 Further, it should be noted that under the
rationale and spirit of the rule in the Wolf case a conviction in the
present case would not have been reversed for that would have been,
in effect, to destroy the "special delicacy of the adjustment to be
preserved between federal ... power and State administration of its
own law."29
On the other hand, if the state were subsequently to subpoena the
enjoined federal official to testify he would be caught between two
contradictory court processes in which case the controversy, under the
federal supremacy doctrine, would be resolved in favor of the federal
court3 -thus reaching a result which could hardly be contended does
not disturb the "adjustment" spoken of above.3 1
In view of the adverse effect of this decision on the executive
branch of the federal government, and the objectionable rationale by
which the power of a state court is restricted, it is submitted that the
25 In the words of Justice Harlan who wrote the dissenting opinion, "So far
as I know this is the first time it has been suggested that the federal courts share
with the executive branch of the Government responsibility for supervising law
enforcement activities as such." Supra note 12 at 218.
20318 U.S. 832 (1943). This case held that a confession obtained by a
federal official during a period of illegal confinement in violation of a federal
statute is inadmissible in a federal prosecution. However, this rule has been held
to be not applicable to state prosecutions so long as the confession is given volun-
tarily. Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951).2 7 The Court in the McNabb case expressly so limited itself and on this very
point declared, "We are not concerned with law enforcement practices except in
so far as courts themselves become instrumentalities of law enforcement." McNabb
v. United States, supra note 19 at 347.
28 Heretofore the Court had refused to extend the basic principle of the
McNabb rule to state prosecutions. Gallegos v. Nebraska, supra note 20 at 63-64;
Stein v. New York 346 U.S. 156, 186-188 (1953).
20 Supra note 9 at 120.
so Ableman v. Booth and United States v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (How. 1858).31 Also the outcome of such a state prosecution as the instant case would be
dependent upon the fortuitous circumstances as to which could be secured first-a
federal injunaction or a state conviction. Such circumstances would promote the
introduction of surprise witnesses.
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Supreme Court should have refrained from the exercise of its dis-
cretionary power in the present case. Upon an appeal from a convic-
tion, the court would then be compelled to consider the admissibility
of such evidence in a proceeding to which a state would be a party,
thereby confronting the Court directly with the problem of federal-
state relations.
Linza B. Inabnit
TORTS-INTENTIONAL-WRoNGFUL DEATH BY LiQuo-Administratrix of
one whose death was caused by drinking a bottle of whiskey sued the
vendor of the whiskey under the wrongful death statute.' The com-
plaint alleged that defendant, while acting within the scope of his
employment as a clerk of a co-defendant, a licensed retailer of pack-
aged liquor, sold the deceased a quart of whiskey for the purpose of
injuring him, knowing him to be intoxicated at the time;2 that the
defendant knew that the deceased bad bet with another person that
he, the deceased, could drink the quart of whiskey without stopping;
that defendant knew that it was for the purpose of settling the bet
that the deceased bought the whiskey and knew that he intended to
drink all of it without stopping; that defendant should have known
that the deceased could not safely be trusted with the whiskey but
that he sold it to him anyway for the purpose of injuring him. The
trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it did not state
a claim on which relief could be granted.3 Held: Reversed. The Court
of Appeals held that the administratrix of one killed by drinking an
excessive quantity of whiskey can maintain an action against the
vendor who sold the whiskey to deceased for the purpose of injuring
him. Nally v. Blandford, 291 S.W. 2d 832 (Ky. 1956).
The decision was based primarily on statements made in Brittol's
Adner. v. Samuels.4 In that case the defendant, knowing plaintiff's in-
testate was an inebriate and intoxicated at the time, sold him whiskey
I Ky. Rev. Stat. 411.130 (hereinafter cited as K.R.S.)
2 The sale of whiskey to a person actually or apparently intoxicated is a viola-
tion of K.R.S. 244.080. In Tate v. Borton, 272 S.W. 2d 333 (Ky. 1954) "intoxica-
tion" is defined as being under the influence of alcohol to such an extent that the
physical and mental faculties are affected and the judgment impaired. This may
be something less than "drunkenness" which the court said is excessive intoxication
but does not necessarily mean stupefaction or helplessness.
3 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure, 8.01. Of these rules Commissioner
Stanley recently said:
"But the simplification and liberality extend to the manner of stating
a case and are not so great as to obviate the necessity of stating the
elements of a cause of action or defense, as the case may be."
4 143 Ky. 129, 136 S.W. 143 (1911).
Johnson v. Coleman, 288 S.W. 2d 348, 349 (Ky. 1956).
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